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NOTES AND COMMENT
The second theory is very satisfactory in the case supposed,'- but if
the figures had been tort claim $3000, mortgage $4000 and supply
claim $1000, then the second objection to the first theory would apply
also to the latter; for while it is true that the mortgagee and supplyman have no just claim upon the fund in excess of the difference between the whole sum and the claim which is superior to each of their
respective claims, yet the same is true of the tort claimant, as would
appear if by chance we had begun our reasoning with him.
It is submitted that the true solution is that the tort claim being
inferior to the supply claim alone is entitled to $3000 in the case last
supposed. By the same process of reasoning the mortgage is entitled
to $2000 and the supply claim to $1000. Since all these may not be
paid out of a $5000 fund, it should be divided in the proportion of
3000 to 2000 to 1000. The tort claimant would then receive onehalf, the mortgagee one-third, and the supplyman one-sixth of the total
sum. If the authorities do not sustain this last method of distributon they are at least not so far committed to any other theory as to
refuse it consideration.' 8
Orlo B. Kellogg.
INHERITANCE BY A MURDERER FROM His VICTiM-The question
whether a murderer can inherit from his victim, except in the case of
life insurance, is usually answered in the affirmative. The rule is
well settled that if the beneficiary under a life insurance policy murders the insured, neither he nor his heirs or representatives can collect
the policy.' But in cases where a devisee or heir has murdered his
testator or ancester, the courts are divided, the majority2 holding that
I That is, the result would be the same where the sums were as first stated,
whether this method of computation or the one which the writer considers correc , is used.
" Supp. U. S. Comp. Stat. '23, § 81463A ppp; Fed. Stat. Ann., 1920 Supp.
257, provides that nothing in the Ship Mortgage Act shall be construed to
affect the "rank of preferred maritime liens among themselves." This note
has been concerned with discussing the effect of the Act on the relative ranking of preferred maritime liens as compared with non-preferred liens, so the
latter section has no application. Nevertheless it might add still further complication if, instead of being as we supposed, there had been two preferred
liens, one of which was subordinated to the supply claim by its holder's laches,
while1 the other was not.
N. Y Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 997
(1886), Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 1 Q. B. 147 (1892), Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 83 W Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865, 7 A. L. R. 823
(1919). But see Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S. W (Tex. Civ. App.) 423
(1918).
2In re Kirby's Estate, 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1088
(1912), Hagen v. Cone, 91 Ga. App. 416, 91 S. B. 602 (1917) Wall v. Pfan8chmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N. E. 785, L. R. A. 1915C, 328 (1914), McAllister v.
Fair,72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726,115 Am. St. Rep. 933, 7
Ann. Cas. 973 (1906), Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W 487, L. R. A.
1916E, 593 (1916), In re Gollnlk's Estate, 112 Minn. 349, 198 N. W 292 (1910),
Shellonberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W 935, -5 L. R. A. 564 (1894),
overruling Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W 700, 10 L. R. A.
810, 28 Am. St. Rep. 500 (1891), Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 940, 6 S. E. 794
(1888) Deem v. Milliken, 53 Oh. St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134 (1895), affirming 6
Ohio C. C. 357, Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111, 50 L. R. A.
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however undesirable it may be for a murderer to profit by his crime,
nevertheless the statutes of wills or of descent are too clear, that the
courts are powerless to read any exception into the statute, and that
until the legislature acts there is no way of preventing the murderer
from profiting by his crime.
Some of the courts3 confirming the murderer's title to his victim's
property cite as authority the various constitutional provisions forbidding forfeitures and corruption of blood, without appearing to consider that what was sought in the cases before them was something
entirely different from the evil at which the constitutional provisions
were aimed. Where a man obtains property by fraud4 or theft,' no
court has ever considered it an unconstitutional forfeiture to compel
him to make restitution. And the fact that he obtains it by murder
would not seem to be any reason for treating his possession with
greater consideration, or as being more particularly within the protection of the constitution.6
Three views as to the legal effect of the murder upon the title of
the property of the deceased have been advanced, first, the legal title
does not pass to the murderer as heir or devisee;' second, the legal
title passes to the murderer and he may retain it in spite of his crime",
third, the legal title passes to the murderer but because of the unconscionable method of obtaining it, he must hold it as constructive trustee
for the other heirs or devisees of his victim. The first two views
consider the legal effect only, and opinions setting them forth are
usually written from the strict common law point of view even though
the action may be on the chancery side of the court. The third view
has been discussed chiefly in the law reviews, 9 but has been recognized
(N. S.) 536 (1913) In re Carpenters Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637, 29 L. R.
A. 14a, 50 Am. St. Rep. 765 (1895) Hill v. Noland, 149 S. W (Tex. Civ. App.)
288 (1912). See also Grandchamptv. Billis, 124 La. 117, 49 So. 998 (1909) Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 393, 100 S. W 108, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 640 (1907).
3
In re Carpenter's Estate, note 2, supra, Wall v. Pfanschmidt, note 2,
supra.
Hansen v. Hansen, 110 Wash. 276, 188 Pac. 460 (1920) Fox v. Hubband,
79 Mo. 390 (1883) Luttrell v. Olmius cited by Lord Eldon in 11 Ves. 638, 14
Yes. 290.
'Nebraska Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 546, 71 N. V 294 (1897)
Grouch v. Hazlehurst Lumber Co., 16 So. (Miss.) 496 (1894).
6
Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Pae. 678 (1918), 104 Kan. 689,
180 Pac. 811 (1919) Box v. Lanier 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S V 1042, 64 L. R. A.
458 (1904) Perry v. Strawbridge, 909 Mo. 6-1, 108 S. W 641, 16 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 244, 123 Am. St. Rep. 510, 14 Ann. Cas. 92 (1908).
'Riggs v. Palmer 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188, a L. R. A. 340, 12 Am. St.
Rep. 849 (1889)
Box v. Lanier note 6, supra, Perry v. Strawbridge, note 6,
supra, Lundy v. Lundy, 94, Can. Sup. Ct. 650; Hall v. Knight (1914), P 1,
In re Oash, 30 New Zealand 577. See also Slocum v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co.,
245 Mass. 265, 139 N. E. 816, 27 A. L. R. 1517 (1923).
'See cases cited in note 2, supra.
14 H.'av. L. REV. 394, 8 HARV. L. REV. 170, 27 HAnv. L. REv. 280, 30
HARv. L. REV. 622, 33 HAnv. L. REV. 423; 24 A,. L. REv. 141, 30 Am. L. REV.
130, 36 Am. L. REG. N. S. 223 (reprinted in A Es' LEc'rUaEs ox LEGAL HISToay, 310), 7 MIcR. L. REV. 71, 160. See also note, 14 Ann. Cas. 99; 6 GREEw

BAG 534.
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as the correct theory in New York,10 has been discussed in Minnesota," and has been rejected in Illinois.' 2 This disposition of the
decedent's property does not read any additional exception into the
statute, but gives it, so far as the bare legal title is concerned, the
effect which the courts holding the second point of view find imperative, and yet, by use of the equitable powers of the court, attains the
result which they admit to be desirable but say can only be reached
through the action of the legislature.
Several states have passed statutes'" to prevent a murderer's taking
by inheritance or devise from his victim, but the traditional strict
common law frame of mind of the courts which rendered the passage
of these statutes necessary, and which is sometimes evidenced in their
construction,' 4 shows that unless the statutes are most carefully drawn,
equitable results will not always follow their passage. There would
seem to be a better prospect of obtaining justice by the adoption of the
flexible equitable remedy of a constructive trust, which can be adjusted to fit the particular circumstances of each ease and to protect
innocent purchasers, than by the legislative enactment of any hard and
fast rule.
A recent case in Washington 5 brought up a slightly different phase
of the general question. The respondent filed a petition in his wife's
"Ellerson v. Westeott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896) Van Astyne v.
Tulfy, 103 Misc. Rep. 4.55, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918) In re Santouran's Estate,
1125 Misc. Rep. 668,.212 N. Y. S. 116 (1925).
11Wellner v. Eckstein, 105 Minn. 444, 117 N. W 830 (1908) (opinion by
Elliott, J.), case decided on another point. But see Gollnik's Estate, note 2,
supra.
U Wall v. Pfanschmidt, note 2, supra.

"Kerr's Califorma Civil Code (1920), § 1409; Burn's Indiana Statutes
(1926), § 3376; Code of Iowa (1924) §§ 12032-4; Revised Statutes of Kansas
(193), § .2-133; Hemingway's Annotated Mississippi Code (19117), §§ 139,
3380; Compiled Statutes of Nebraska (1922), § 1238; Compiled Statutes of

Oklahoma (1921), § 11319; Shannon's Annotated Code of Tennessee (19171),
§ 4171al, Virgima Code of 1921, § 5.74; Wyoming Compiled Statutes (1920),
§ 7010. See also Merrick's Louisiana Civil Code (1925), §§ 1559, 1560, 1710.
iiHarrson
v. MXncraia, 264 Fed. 776 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920), a conviction

of murder in Kansas did not prevent the murderer's inheriting her victim's
property m Oklahoma, though both Oklahoma and Kansas had similar statutes

prohibiting a convicted murder from inheriting from his victim; In re Kuhn's
Estate, 195 Iowa 449, 101 N. W 151 (1904), as a widow takes her statutory
share as matter of contract and right, a statute prohibiting a murderer from
taking is victim's property by devise or descent did not affect a woman who
murdered her husband, In re Emerson's Estate, 191 Iowa 906, 183 N. W 327
(1921), statute does not affect remainderman who murders life tenant; Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W 108, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 640 (1907),

statute prohibiting murderer from taking by devise or descent from his victim
does not apply to estate by entirety- In rq Kirby, 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370, 39

L. R. A. (N. S.) 1088 (1912), statute prohibiting one convicted of murder from
taking from his victimb does not apply to one convicted of manslaughter. See
also Mertes' Estate, 181 Ind. 478, 104 N. R. 753 (1914).
"In re Tyler's Estate, 40 Wash. Dec. 518, 250 Pac. 456 (1926).
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estate asking to have $3000 of her separate estate, there being no community property, set aside to him in lieu of homestead under the
statute.16 In her answer, the administratrix, joined by the heirs at
law of the deceased, alleged as an affirmative defense, that he had murdered his wife, had been tried, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment
for life in the penitentiary and was serving the sentence. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to this affirmative defense, excluded all
evidence in support of it, and set aside to the murderer the requested
portion of his victim's estate. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court, by a
five to four decision, held that the answer stated a good defense and
reversed the judgment with instructions to overrule the demurrer and
receive evidence in support of the answer.

The opinion of the Court discusses the matter at length, but from
the same strictly common law point of view as that from which the
question had been presented in both briefs, and holds that the decisions 1" refusing to allow the murderer to profit by his crime, though
fewer in number, are better in reason. The minority dissented upon
the grounds given in the cases' which the majority refused to follow
These cases relied on by the minority (and the others cited in note 2,
supra) illustrate a strict adherence to the letter of the statute ignoring equitable principles and remedies, and say that a court of equity
is no longer able to meet a new situation, but must wait for the legislature to correct an evil that in former times the chancellor would
have easily corrected by the application of well known equitable
remedies.

If the constructive trust theory, which is based upon the same fundamental principles as those upon which the Court relied, had been
presented to the Court, it is possible that the Court would have adopted

it and have united in a decision holding that the $3000 should be set
aside to the murderer under the statute, but requiring him to hold it
as constructive trustee for his victim's heirs. This would have given

to the statute the construction which the minority felt imperative, but
would have corrected its admitted injustice by a well recognized
equitable remedy. The final result would have been the same as that
actually reached, but being on a sounder theory, the decision would

have been less likely to meet the fate of the first decision in Shellenberger
v. Ransom,'9 and would have been a more persuasive precedent to
guide to a just result those courts which have not yet had the question
H. C. Force.
before them.

21Rem. Comp. Stat. § 1473; P C. § 9893 amended, Laws 1923, p. 457.
'Citing the first four cases in note 7, supra.
11Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania
cases cited in note 2, supra.
"31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W 700, 10 L. R. A. 810, reversed in Shellenberger v.
Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W 935, 05 L. R. A. 564" A31Es' LECrTUES ON
LIEGAL HisroR, 31- note -0,supra.

